Accidents

Grounding of The Pride of Canterbury

An unapproved electronic chart system was apparently being used as the primary means of navigation for the passenger ferry The Pride of Canterbury. Due to user settings a charted wreck would not have been displayed on this system. The vessel grounded on the wreck, causing severe damage to her port propeller system.

On 31 January 2008, the roll-on roll-off passenger ferry, Pride of Canterbury grounded on a charted wreck  while sheltering from heavy weather in an area known as ‘The Downs’ off Deal, Kent.

The vessel suffered  severe damage to her port propeller system but was able to proceed unaided to Dover, where she berthed  with the assistance of two tugs.  The vessel had been in the area for over 4 hours when, while approaching a turn at the northern extremity,  the bridge team became distracted by a fire alarm and a number of telephone calls for information of a  non-navigational nature. The vessel overshot the northern limit of the identified safe area before the turn  was started. The Officer Of the Watch (OOW) became aware that the vessel was passing close to a charted  shoal, but he was unaware that there was a charted wreck on the shoal. The officer was navigating by eye  and with reference to an electronic chart system which was sited prominently at the front of the bridge, but  he was untrained in the use and limitations of the system. The wreck would not have been displayed on  the electronic chart due to the user settings in use at the time. A paper chart was available, but positions  had only been plotted on it sporadically and it was not referred to at the crucial time.

Although the Voyage Management System (VMS) was loaded with Electronic Navigational Charts (ENCs)  for the vessel’s area of operation, the system had not been approved by the Maritime and Coastguard  Agency (MCA) as the owner’s policy was for the VMS to be used as an aid to navigation only, with Pride  of Canterbury’s paper charts being utilised as the primary means for navigation. Relevant admiralty charts  were supplied to the vessel for this purpose.

Despite the VMS being unapproved for use as the primary means of navigation, the officers on Pride of  Canterbury were apparently using it as if it was. Furthermore, many of the officers, including the Chief  Officer, who was in charge at the time of the accident, were not fully trained in the use of the system.

This incident highlights the importance of the accuracy Data Property, with regards to the information  displayed on the electronic chart. It also highlights the importance of the completeness Data Property, with  regards to training (and training records) and the intended destination / usage Data Property, with regards to  the inappropriate use of the VMS data.

Links 

• https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/547c700ded915d4c0d000071/PrideofCanterburyReport.pdf
  (accessed 29 November 2017).